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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
CARL DEAN HOWARD, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 990586-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for unlawful possession of a 
controlled substance, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1998). This 
Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The sole issue before this Court is whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's 
suppression motion which alleged that his constitutional right against unreasonable searches 
and seizures was violated when police temporarily detained him to ascertain whether or not 
he had an outstanding warrant for probation violations. 
Standard of Review. "The factual findings underlying a trial court's decision to grant 
or deny a motion to suppress evidence are reviewed under the deferential clearly-erroneous 
standard, and the legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, with a measure of discretion 
1 
given to the trial judge's application of the legal standard to the facts." State v. Moreno, 910 
P.2d 1245,1247 (Utah App.), cert denied, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996); accord State v. Pena, 
869 P.2d 932, 939 & n. 4 (Utah 1994). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The interpretation of the following constitutional provision is determinative of the 
appeal or of central importance to the appeal: 
U.S. Constitution, 4th Amendment 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Defendant was charged by information with unlawful possession of a controlled 
substance. R. 08-09. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized incident to his arrest 
on an outstanding warrant. R. 25-31. After a hearing on the matter, the trial court entered 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and denied defendant's motion. R. 51-53, 55. 
Thereafter, defendant entered a guilty plea to the charge, reserving the right to appeal the trial 
court's denial of his motion to suppress pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 
1988). R. 57-64. The trial court fined defendant $900 and sentenced him to an indeterminate 
term of zero-to-five years in the Utah State Prison. R. 65-67. The court suspended the prison 
term and defendant was placed on two years supervised probation. R. 67. In accordance 
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with the plea agreement, imposition of the sentence was stayed pending a decision on appeal. 
R. 62, 65, 69. Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal. R. 70. 
SUMMARY OF FACTS 
The Newscast on Gary Lewis. On the evening ofNovember 18,1998, Sergeant Craig 
Park of the Salt Lake City Police Department was at home watching the news on television. 
R. 74: 10-11,17-18. Sergeant Park became particularly interested in what he described as 
a "pretty interesting, compelling story" about an individual who was stalking his wife. See 
R. 74: 19. The program featured the story of Mary Lewis and the criminal case against her 
husband Gary Lewis for stalking. R. 02: ex2.] The story included several photographs of 
Mr. Lewis and related the incidents which presumably gave rise to the stalking charges. R. 
02: ex2. 
The news story also indicated that although Lewis had been placed on probation for 
felony theft that year, he "ended up behind bars several times" for violating probation. R. 
02: ex2. The news story revealed that Lewis had agreed to wear an electronic monitoring 
bracelet. R. 02: ex2. However, Lewis admitted to having cut off the bracelet in a hearing 
before a district court. R. 02: ex2. The story indicated that although Lewis was ordered 
^ e record includes a manila envelope, indexed at page 2 of the record, which 
contains two exhibits introduced by the State: State's Exhibit 1 (exl), which is the 
booking photograph of defendant, and State's Exhibit 2 (ex2), which is a video copy of 
the news program viewed by Sergeant Park the night before defendant's arrest. Citation 
to these exhibits will refer to the index page followed by the exhibit number, e.g., R. 02: 
exl andR. 02: ex2. 
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back to jail for cutting off the bracelet, he was released the following day. R. 02: ex2.2 
Mary Lewis, as well as Adult Probation and Parole, became aware of Lewis's release only 
because Mary Lewis's sister saw him drive by in a car. R. 02: ex2. The news story then 
indicated: 
Lewis has been ordered to remain in jail with no bond until he heads to court 
on the stalking charges. He's been released three times, all because the Salt 
Lake County jail is too crowded. 
R. 02: ex2. After a film clip of the jail door slamming shut, the report indicated that the Salt 
Lake County jail must release some prisoners when it reaches about 800 inmates. A 
correctional officer then stated: 
And he qualifies for release under the federal consent decree. Um, in our 
computer system, it doesn't show him as having a real violent history in the 
past that the public would be aware of, that we would want them to be aware 
of. So he got released. 
R. 02: ex2. The program finished with a clip of Mary Lewis, saying, "The bottom line is 
that I'm in fear for my life. I am in fear for my life." R. 02: ex2. 
Although Sergeant Park did not observe any distinguishing characteristics in Lewis, 
his face "stuck in [his] mind" because he resembled an officer who had worked for the police 
department. R. 74: 12, 20. After viewing the news program, Sergeant Park believed that 
Lewis was a "wanted fugitive." R. 74: 22. He did not recall a discussion about a consent 
decree release. R. 74: 21-22. 
2The news story included a segment of the hearing before the district court, which 
indicated that the hearing was held on November 17, 1998, the day before the news 
program aired. R. 02: ex2. 
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Defendant's Arrest. The following morning as Sergeant Park was driving to work, 
he saw defendant riding a bicycle northbound on State Street in Salt Lake City. R. 74:10-11, 
17. After observing defendant, Sergeant Park believed him to be Gary Lewis—the subject 
of the news story the night before. R. 74:11,16; compare R. 02: exl (defendant's booking 
photograph) with R. 02: ex2. Shortly after spotting defendant, Sergeant Park lost sight of 
him when defendant turned off State Street. See R. 74:12-13. Believing defendant to be the 
individual who was the subject of the newscast the night before, Sergeant Park broadcast 
over his radio a description of defendant and his bicycle, the defendant's direction of travel, 
and the fact that he believed the unknown bike rider was wanted. R. 74: 12-13,22. 
Within not more than one to two minutes after the broadcast, Officer Wihongi spotted 
defendant less than two blocks from where Sergeant Park had initially observed him. See R. 
74: 14.3 When Sergeant Park arrived at the scene of the stop, Officer Wihongi was holding 
defendant's identification awaiting a call back from dispatch as to whether or not defendant 
had any outstanding warrants. R. 74:15. Defendant was not handcuffed or otherwise under 
arrest at that time. R. 74: 14. Within one to two minutes after Sergeant Park's arrival, 
dispatch reported that defendant did in fact have an outstanding warrant. R. 74:15. A search 
of defendant incident to his arrest on the warrant uncovered methamphetamine in his pocket. 
R.58. 
3The stop occurred on 300 South between State Street and Main Street. R. 58, 74: 
14. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Contrary to defendant's claim on appeal, the trial court correctly concluded that 
defendant's detention for a brief warrants check was supported by reasonable suspicion. A 
newscast the night before defendant's arrest reported that Gary Lewis had been sent to jail 
for cutting off an electronic monitoring bracelet, but was released the following day due to 
overcrowding. However, the report continued, indicating that Lewis was ordered to remain 
in jail without bond until he appeared in court on a stalking charge involving his wife. The 
report also indicated that Mary Lewis was in fear for her life and had obtained a protective 
order against her husband. She learned of his release through her sister who had seen Lewis 
drive by in a car. Mary Lewis also stated that her husband continued to retrieve her mail. 
The brief stop of defendant, who substantially resembled Lewis, to determine if he was the 
individual wanted out of Ogden was reasonable, especially in light of law enforcement's 
heightened role in protecting victim's of domestic violence. The officer's reliance on the 
report was also reasonable. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT 
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF DETENTION TO CHECK FOR WARRANTS 
WAS SUPPORTED BY REASONABLE SUSPICION 
Defendant's sole claim on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying his motion to 
suppress the evidence seized upon his arrest for an outstanding warrant. Aplt. Brf. at 2-3. 
He argues that the evidence should have been excluded because his Fourth Amendment right 
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against unreasonable searches and seizures was violated when he was temporarily detained 
based on an officer's belief that he was wanted for probation violations. Aplt. Brf. at 10. 
A. The Reasonable Suspicion Standard. 
The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. 
Const, amend. IV. Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,88 S.Ct. 1868(1968), and its progeny, 
an investigatory stop is reasonable if (1) the stop is justified at its inception, and (2) the scope 
of the search or detention is reasonably related to the circumstances which rendered the stop 
permissible at the outset. State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127,1131-32 (Utah 1994) (citing Terry, 
392 U.S. at 1920, 88 S.Ct. at 1879). On appeal, defendant only challenges the basis for the 
initial stop and this Court need not therefore address the scope of the detention.4 
An investigatory stop is justified at its inception if the police "officer has reasonable, 
articulable suspicion that the person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal 
activity." United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2642 (1983); accord 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,940 (Utah 1994); State v. Tetmyer, 947 P.2d 1157,1159 (Utah 
App. 1997). The reviewing court will "look to the totality of the circumstances present at the 
time of the stop to determine if there was an objective basis for suspecting criminal activity." 
4The State did not argue or introduce evidence below that Officer Wihongi's 
questioning of defendant was a mere level one encounter not subject to the Fourth 
Amendment. Accordingly, the only issue on appeal is whether the level two stop was 
supported by reasonable suspicion. See Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App. 5, f 11 
(observing that a level two stop, subject to the Fourth Amendment, occurs "'even if the 
purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention brief"). 
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State v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137,141 (Utah App. 1997). In the probation or parole context, 
the courts have observed that "reasonable suspicion requires no more than that the authority 
acting be able to point to specific and articulable facts that, taken together with rational 
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant a belief in the conclusion... that a condition 
of parole has been or is being violated." Velasquez, 672 P.2d at 1260 n. 5 (quoting United 
States v. Scott, 678 P.2d 32, 35 (5th Cir. 1982); see also State v. Davis, 965 P.2d 525, 530 
(Utah App. 1998), cert denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999) (applying the reasonable suspicion 
standard in the probation context). 
Although this Court reviews for correctness a trial court's conclusion that reasonable 
suspicion existed, it grants a measure of discretion to the trial court in its application of the 
reasonable suspicion standard to the particular facts of the case, Pena, 869 P.2d at 939. This 
is especially true where, as here, the fact pattern is so unique that the limits have not been 
determined by the appellate courts. See State v. Case, 884P.2d 1274,1276 n. 1 (Utah 1994). 
B. The Facts Known to the Officer Created Reasonable Suspicion. 
When viewed in light of the totality of the circumstances, the brief detention of 
defendant here was supported by reasonable suspicion and the trial court's denial of the 
motion to suppress was therefore correct. Although Officer Wihongi made the stop, the 
legality of the detention depends on the sufficiency of the articulable facts known to Sergeant 
Park. See City of St George v. Carter, 945 P.2d 165, 168 (Utah App. 1997), cert denied, 
953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1998). 
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The News Program. The news program, which provided the basis for Sergeant Park's 
suspicion, reported the following information: 
• Mary Lewis was hiding from her husband, Gary Lewis, and she is in fear for 
her life (per reporter and Mary Lewis) 
• Mary Lewis had a protective order in place prohibiting Gary Lewis from 
approaching within 500 feet of her (per reporter) 
• Mary Lewis had her telephone number changed, but Gary Lewis retrieved 
the number nevertheless (per Mary Lewis) 
• Gary Lewis has taken her mail from her house and although she had her post 
office box rekeyed,.Gary Lewis retrieved her mail and continues to retrieve 
her mail (per Mary Lewis) 
• Gary Lewis was placed on three years probation for a felony theft conviction 
(per reporter) 
• Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P) verified that Gary Lewis had violated 
the terms of his probation for felony theft, including the filing of stalking 
charges, failure to pay restitution, use of marijuana, and contact with Mary 
Lewis (per probation officer) 
• On October 12, 1998, Gary Lewis agreed to wear a non-removable 
monitoring bracelet (per reporter) 
• Just 11 days later, Gary Lewis cut off the bracelet (per reporter) 
• Gary Lewis admitted in open court that he had cut off the bracelet (per Gary 
Lewis in court) 
• Gary Lewis was sent back to jail for cutting off his bracelet but released the 
following day (per reporter) 
• Mary Lewis's sister saw Gary Lewis drive by in his car the day after he was 
released from jail (per Mary Lewis's sister) 
• AP&P was unaware of Gary Lewis's release from jail (per Mary Lewis's 
sister) 
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. •• Gary Lewis has been ordered to remain in jail with no bond until he heads 
to court on the stalking charges (per reporter) 
• Gary Lewis has been released from jail three times due to overcrowding (per 
reporter) 
• Gary Lewis qualified for release under the federal consent decree because 
jail records do not indicate that he has a real violent history 
R. 02: ex2. The foregoing information provided Sergeant Park with more than a sufficient 
basis to conclude that Lewis was wanted on the stalking charge. Place, 462 U.S. at 702,103 
S.Ct. at 2642. 
The program reported that although Lewis was on probation for a felony theft 
conviction, he had "ended up behind bars several times" since probation had originally been 
ordered. R. 02: ex2. A probation officer then indicated, among other things, that stalking 
charges had been filed against Lewis in Ogden City. R. 02: ex2. Shortly after reporting that 
Lewis had been sent back to jail for cutting off an electronic monitoring bracelet, only to be 
released the following day, the reporter stated that "Lewis has been ordered to remain in jail 
with no bond until he heads to court on the stalking charge." R. 02: ex2 (emphasis added). 
This statement may have reasonably left Sergeant Park with the impression that although 
Lewis may have been released from the Salt Lake County jail, he was still under order of the 
Ogden court to remain in jail until he appeared in court on the stalking charge. R. 02: ex2. 
Defendant argues that because Lewis would have been held in the Weber County jail 
for stalking charges arising in Ogden, a question arises as to "what had been holding Gary 
Lewis in the Salt Lake County jail." Aplt. Brf. at 16. The report indicated that Lewis was 
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sent to jail, presumably in Salt Lake County, for cutting off his electronic monitoring 
bracelet. R. 02: ex2. The officer thus could have reasonably concluded that the bracelet was 
a condition of his probation on the felony theft conviction and that the Salt Lake County jail 
inadvertently released defendant. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court in Terry remarked that reasonableness can best be 
determined "by balancing the need to search (or seize) against the invasion which the search 
(or seizure) entails.'" 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1879 (citations omitted). "[B]ecause 
domestic violence is serious in nature and has a high likelihood of repeated violence, 
incidents of domestic abuse require the mandatory and immediate attention of law 
enforcement." State v. Farrow, 919 P.2d 50, 54 (Utah App. 1996). Here, Mary Lewis had 
stated that she was in fear for her life and had a protective order against her husband. R. 02: 
ex2. Lewis continued to retrieve her mail. R. 02: ex2. Within a day of Lewis's release, 
Mary Lewis's sister saw him drive by in a car. R. 02: ex2. Given the heightened duty of law 
enforcement to protect those who may be the victims of domestic violence, see Spouse 
Abuse Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-36-1 to 77-36-9 (Supp. 1998), the officer's 
brief investigatory stop of defendant cannot be said to be unreasonable. The officers' actions 
were consistent with law enforcement's duty to protect victims of domestic violence, and 
given the facts before them, including the report that Lewis was to remain in jail pending his 
appearance on the stalking charge, the brief and minimal detention of defendant was 
reasonable. 
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That Sergeant Park reasonably believed Lewis was a fugitive from Ogden may have 
been bolstered as a result of the correctional officer's remarks toward the end of the news 
segment. The correctional officer said that a prisoner is released under the federal consent 
decree only if he does not have a "real violent history." R. 02: ex2. While a probation 
violation may not indicate violence, stalking does. Indeed, "domestic violence" is defined 
by statute as the commission or attempt to commit stalking, among a number of other 
offenses, by one cohabitant against another. Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-l(2)(i) (Supp. 1996). 
Based on this information, Sergeant Park could reasonably believe that the release occurred 
without knowledge of the Ogden court's order. Nor would Lewis appear to have any right 
to a release if it were inadvertent. Cases which have discussed an inadvertent release have 
concluded that the re-incarceration will be estopped only if "the government's wrongful 
conduct [ ] threaten[s] 'to work a serious injustice.'" Johnson v. Williford, 682 F.2d 868,871 
(9th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted) (estopping the government from re-incarcerating a 
defendant who was prematurely paroled despite eight parole reviews). Under an order to 
remain in jail without bond pending appearance on the stalking charges, Lewis's detention 
cannot be seen as a serious injustice. 
The reasonableness of Sergeant Park's suspicion is buttressed by the fact that Lewis 
warranted sufficient concern while on probation that the Court ordered him to wear an 
electronic monitoring bracelet. His failure to do so resulted in him being sent back to jail, 
only to be released the following day. 
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B. The Reliability of the Information on the Newscast. 
Defendant argues that the news program was not sufficiently reliable to support 
reasonable suspicion. Aplt. Brf. at 12. Contrary to defendant's claim, however, the 
information carried sufficient indicia of reliability to justify the officer's reliance thereon. 
Reliability of Newscast Defendant first argues that the source of the information-a 
television news report-was inherently unreliable. Aplt. Brf. at 12. Defendant contends that 
information from a news report, like that from a police informant, is on the low end of the 
reliability scale. Aplt. Brf. at 12-13. He baldly alleges that unlike tips from citizen 
informants, newscasts are not prepared primarily out of concern for the community, but for 
financial gain. Aplt. Brf. at 13. This argument ignores the traditional and well-recognized 
role of the press in informing the public. The Supreme Court has "consistently recognized 
the unique role that the press plays in 'informing and educating the public, offering criticism, 
and providing a forum for discussion and debate/" Attorney General v. Michigan Chamber 
of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 667, 110 S.Ct. 1391, 1402 (1966) (citations omitted). 
While a tabloid may deserve to be placed on the low end of the reliability scale, a 
newscast from a local television station upon whom the public daily relies for accurate and 
reliable news does not. Contrary to defendant's assertion, newscasts are more like tips from 
a citizen informant, which do not need independent proof of reliability or veracity, because 
the report is made out of concern for the community. See Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 
P.2d 321,235 (Utah App. 1997). 
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Moreover, the information in the newscast did not come from the reporter alone. 
Mary Lewis herself stated in the segment that she was in fear for her life, that her husband 
continues to retrieve her mail, and that he is attempting to control her life. R. 02: ex2. Her 
sister stated that she observed Lewis drive by in the car subsequent to his release. R. 02: ex2. 
A probation officer stated that Lewis has had a number of probation violations, including the 
filing of the stalking charges, failure to pay restitution, contact with Mary Lewis, and use of 
marijuana. R. 02: ex2. Finally, the segment included a district court hearing in which Lewis 
himself admitted to cutting off the electronic monitoring device. R. 02: ex2. Although the 
reporter stated that Lewis was on probation, that he was ordered to wear the monitoring 
bracelet, and that he was ordered to remain in jail without bond until his appearance on the 
stalking charge, the direct information in the newscast from the original sources served to 
corroborate and lend credibility to the reporter's statements. 
Moreover, as the Kansas Court of Appeals observed, "the greater and more immediate 
the risk to the public revealed by the tip, the less importance [the court] will accord to the 
process of corroboration or verification of the tip." State v. Tucker, 878 P.2d 855,862 (Kan. 
App. 1994). Here, Mary Lewis had expressed that she was in fear for her life. R. 02: ex2. 
Although defendant was sent to jail for cutting off his monitoring bracelet, he was released 
without the knowledge of AP&P the following day-even though he was apparently still 
under court order to remain in jail without bond pending his appearance on the stalking 
charge. R. 02: ex2. Finally, Mary Lewis's sister saw defendant drive by in his car. R. 02: 
14 
ex2. Given these facts, Sergeant Park acted reasonably in directing that a brief investigatory 
stop be made without further corroboration. 
Defendant Reasonably Matched Description of Lewis. Defendant also contends 
that Sergeant Park did not have enough information to reasonably conclude that he matched 
Lewis's description. Aplt. Brf. at 17. In support of this contention, defendant cites to United 
States v. Board, 744 F.Supp. 6,7 (D.D.C. 1990), and United States v. Jones, 619 F.2d 494, 
497 (5th Cir. 1980). Aplt. Brf. at 19-20. Neither case, however, presented facts such as 
those presented here. 
In both Board and Jones, the police were working off a description of the suspect 
broadcast over the police radio. Board, 114 F.Supp. at 7; Jones, 619 F.2d at 497. Here, 
however, defendant had seen several photographs of Lewis the night before. Indeed, Lewis's 
appearance was notable to Sergeant Park because Lewis looked like an officer who had 
worked in the police department. R. 74: 12,20. Although the photographs in the newscast 
did not give the viewer an indication of Lewis's height, they did give the viewer a sense of 
Lewis's build. See R. 02: ex2. 
Defendant, in fact, strongly resembled Lewis. The trial court so concluded, finding 
that defendant "substantially resembles the photographs of Lewis as displayed on the FOX 
News Program." R. 52. Defendant has failed to show that this finding was clearly 
erroneous. Moreno, 910 P.2d at 1247. Indeed, a comparison of the photographs in the 
newscast with Lewis's booking photograph demonstrates their remarkable similarity. 
15 
Compare R. 02: ex2 with R. 02: exl.5 See United States v. Lang, 81 F.3d 955,966 (10th Cir. 
1996) (upholding the trial court's finding that the suspect's mug shot picture looked very 
much like defendant). 
The Officer's Failure to Remember Lewis's Name. Defendant also contends that 
any stop was unreasonable because Sergeant Park did not remember Lewis's name. 
However, believing that Lewis was a wanted fugitive and that he may be stalking his wife, 
police acted reasonably in briefly detaining defendant to run a warrant's check. Although 
knowing Lewis's name may have been helpful, it was not necessary. If Lewis was wanted 
in Ogden on the stalking charges or for violating probation, the police could reasonably 
expect to leam that information through the warrants check. Moreover, police had to stop 
defendant in any case-even had they known his name-to determine if he was Lewis. 
Because Sergeant Park did not remember Lewis's name, he reasonably sought to confirm his 
suspicions by running a brief warrants check. 
* * * 
In sum, Sergeant Park's actions were consistent with the high priority placed on 
protecting victims of domestic violence, while comporting to the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment. The police officer's brief stop of defendant to determine if he was the 
5Defendant also contends that it was unreasonable to stop defendant because he 
was riding a bicycle rather than driving a car. Aplt. Brf. at 18-19. However, contrary to 
defendant's assertion, it is not unreasonable to conclude that while Lewis may have been 
seen driving a car the day before, he could be riding a bicycle the next day. 
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individual Sergeant Park believed was wanted was reasonable given the information 
provided in the report. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that the Court affirm 
defendant's conviction. 
Respectfully submitted this^?Q day of March, 2000. 
JAN GRAHAM 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
iY S. GRAY 
TSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Attorneys for Appellee, State of Utah 
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